U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping

Toward a New Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose

We are, therefore, seeing the emergence of an asymmetric world in which the fulcrums of economic and military power are no longer co-located, but, in fact, are beginning to diverge significantly. Political power, through the agency of foreign policy, sits uncomfortably somewhere in between. As a result, in the absence of sophisticated diplomacy, over the coming decade we are likely to see more differences emerge between Washington and Beijing, rather than fewer. This will be exacerbated by the underlying reality that the U.S. and China have different national interests. They come from vastly different civilizational, cultural and linguistic traditions. They have significantly different sets of values. Neither has a history of close strategic collaboration with the other. Instead, their shared strategic history is a combination of proxy conflict over Taiwan, open conflict in Korea, and deep ideological enmity, followed by a period of pragmatic collaboration against a common enemy in the Soviet Union, and, more recently, a period of significant economic interdependence.

The central question for all of us is whether these changes in the regional and global distribution of power can occur peacefully, in a manner which preserves the stability and prosperity of Asia, while preserving the underlying values and institutional framework of the post-war order. No one should assume that the current order cannot be radically improved. The uncomfortable truth is that our existing system of global governance, anchored in the United Nations (UN) and the Bretton Woods institutions, is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. We can see this in its cumbersome response to the great global security, economic, social and environmental challenges of our time. For this reason, no one should assume, a priori, that a greater Chinese role in the order is by definition detrimental. That is simply not the case. The question is whether the unfolding dynamics in U.S.-China relations will result in an international system that is better or worse than the present one, warts and all.

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Organization: 
Harvard University

Can Carbon Taxes be Good for China and the United States?

One way that China may meaningfully control its emissions is through the recent idea of a national carbon permit trading system, building on its carbon permit pilot programs. In China’s case, the internal debate about promulgating these actions centers on the implicit question of whether the cost to the economy of pricing carbon is worth the benefit of mitigating the impacts of climate change. Underlying the debates regarding the regulation of carbon through taxes, permits, or regulations is premised on a widespread assumption that controlling carbon will be bad for economic growth. The key finding in this report, however, is that carbon taxes, provided that the revenue is recycled to cut taxes in other areas, can be good for economic welfare and boost economic growth. The basic reason for this potentially provocative result is that carbon taxes are more efficient than other forms of taxation and can offset inefficiencies in the existing tax structure.

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Topics: 
Environment
Organization: 
Paulson Institute

Can Fracking Green China’s Growth?

This paper analyses the best available technical, scientific, and engineering literature on the risks and opportunities posed by shale gas, and also what policy environment could maximise the opportunity and minimise the risk. It also analyses China’s current policies and practice to understand whether the conditions for greener growth are in place.

Environment

04.24.15

Fracking May be Needed in China to Wean it Off Coal

from chinadialogue
Fracking of China’s huge shale gas reserves will only have a modest impact on the environment if anti-pollution controls—many of them new—are enforced rigorously, says a new report from the U.K.-based Overseas Development Institute (ODI).The ODI...

The authors conclude that many of the environmental risks shale gas poses are manageable, and amenable to conventional environmental law and policy tools. Its development could in principle offer significant net environmental benefits if the gas produced permanently replaces coal and helps set China on a pathway to a renewable-dominated energy system. The greater impediment is political, hinging on whether China has the political will and capacity to dramatically cap coal generation, invest in renewable energy and enforce strong environmental regulations and targets.

The authors emerge from their analysis with a dose of skepticism about unconventional gas greening China’s growth: truly making it work requires a broader set of practical commitments to sustainability, pollution control, and low-carbon energy.

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Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China

China represents and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come. As such, the need for a more coherent U.S. response to increasing Chinese power is long overdue. Because the American effort to “integrate” China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia—and could result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.

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