September 2008

U.S. officials saw relations with Taiwan as especially troubled during the 109th Congress in 2005-2006, beset by the increasing complexity and unpredictability of Taiwan’s democratic political environment as well as by PRC actions underscoring Beijing’s assertion that it had the right to use force to prevent Taiwan independence. Two developments concerning Taiwan were particularly nettlesome to U.S. policymakers in 2005-2006. The first was Beijing’s enactment on March 14, 2005, of a ten-article “anti-secession law” aimed at reining in Taiwan independence advocates. While much of the law spoke of conciliatory measures—such as encouraging cross-strait economic and cultural exchanges and resumption of direct trade, air, and mail links—Article 8 of the anti-secession law specifically authorized the use of “non-peaceful means” to reunify Taiwan with China. The second irritant was President Chen Shui-bian’s decision early in 2006 to scrap two defunct but politically important symbols: the National Unification Council (NUC) and the Guidelines on National Reunification (GNR). While still pursuing a closer U.S. relationship with Taiwan, U.S. officials and some Members of Congress spent 2005-2006 balancing criticisms of the PRC military buildup opposite Taiwan with periodic cautions and warnings to the effect that U.S. support for Taiwan was not unconditional, but had limits.